微观论剑：学习心得

——对三本高微经典教材的品评

       国内高级微观经济学教科书，无疑应以varian的〈微观经济学（高级教程）〉与mas-colell，whiston,green合著的<微观经济学〉为翘楚。新近上海财大出版社出版的jehle和reny合著的〈高级微观经济理论〉也号称是微观教科书之新贵，欲与前二者三分天下，主宰江湖。
       这三本书各有千秋，窃比之于当今武侠小说三足：varian的〈微观经济学（高级教程）〉为古龙小说；mas-colell，whiston,green合著的<微观经济学〉为金庸小说；jehle和reny合著的〈高级微观经济理论〉为梁羽生小说。似乎曾在论坛上看到有网友类似形容，如果有，就算我掠美了。不过经济学与武侠小说看似风马牛不相及，的确有其相通之处。
        Varian的〈微观经济学（高级教程）由27个微观专题组成，几乎每一章的题目都只是一个简单词，如“技术”“对偶“”选择“”需求“”垄断“交换“等等，从目录就绝对可以看出其浓厚古龙风格。语言言简意赅，行文疏离冷寂，但绝对不是〈高级微观经济理论〉译者王根蓓老师所说的“缺少玉树临风般的韵味和风致”，恰恰相反，varian的风格就是如此风神潇洒，绝对不会多说一个字，但每一个字都是那么有力，每一个字就如同是一把飞刀。同时，varian也绝对不缺乏古龙式的冷幽默，第19页的注释就以degree一词在英文中的polysemies给读者开了个玩笑。156页在说明工作时间不能超过其最大约束时，竟然诙谐的说：“也许期末考试的时候除外”，每个期末开惯了夜车的人都不会不发出会意的微笑，原来美国大学生，也是如此。535页数学附录中，范翁竟然也承认最大化二阶条件的难以记忆，“至少我是如此”，读到此处，觉得名高天下的范翁尚且在这种基础问题上犯难，我辈复登临者，又岂能畏难哉!（值得一提的是，varian的中级微观实在是一本不可多得的中级教材，其最大的特色在于中级与高级架起一道桥梁。中国学生从中级转到高级时，往往觉得其中相去甚远，仿佛是两门学科，易生畏惧，而varian的中级则为刚学完初级或者一般中级的同学提供了一本绝好的高级入门。当然，中级与高级对照参看效果更佳。当年学习中级是用的周惠中的那本，这本书内容普通，但习题很好，似乎是为varian的中级而设置的。课后讨论习题的时候，总是觉得所学知识不够。那时候对varian的中级认识还不够。）
      据说梁羽生的小说总是开篇精彩，然后越写才气越少，色彩越黯淡，情节发展如同水平线，高潮部分敷衍了之，最后草草结尾。jehle和reny合著的〈高级微观经济理论〉就有这种意味。这本书的开篇从偏好假设引出效用函数的一段是绝对精彩的，假设逐步严格让读者逐一明白各假设的必要性及其意义，难怪乎平新乔的〈十八讲〉之开篇也引用了这种叙述方法。需求理论还是比较出色，厂商理论也还不错，只是到了微观本应精彩的局部均衡和产业组织的高潮部分，这本书却让我们相当失望。（当然产业组织部分薄弱是这三本书的通病，倒是国内南开大学蒋殿春模仿varian的一本高级教材，产业组织部分相当丰富完备，只是这本书罗嗦错漏之处较多，读者不可不察。不过，如果有Tirole的〈产业组织理论〉在案头，这部分理论又有何惧？）一般均衡和福利经济学部分还差强人意，但不知博弈论部分反在一般均衡之后？最后信息经济学部分则更象是一本专业书籍上摘录下来的，而不象是一本微观经济学的信息经济学部分。而且，相对全书篇幅来说，拍卖与机制设计部分太多了。
      金庸小说与梁羽生小说恰恰相反，往往开头平淡中孕育玄机，随着情节逐步展开，人物越来越多，故事越来越纷纭复杂，但又环环入扣，引人入胜，如同烧一壶水，火越来越旺，水越来越沸腾。mas-colell，whiston,green合著的<微观经济学〉就深得其趣。全书结构博大雄浑，几乎涉及到了微观经济学的各个大小领域，但其结构安排井然有序，娓娓道来，绝对不失散乱。开篇高屋建瓴，给出了消费者理论的两种研究方法，选择法与偏好法同等对待，并行不悖，详细的论述了两种方法个中联系，逐步添加假设，以得出更深层次之结论，让读者对各假设与定义之来龙去脉了然于胸，而不仅是概念之堆积（varian之偏好假设部分似有此嫌）。这部分的特色还在于作出了总需求的推导，并分析了个人需求叠加为总需求后需求函数性质保留问题，让读者心安理得。此书厂商理论虽仍有其特色，终究失之薄弱。这也是一般高级微观通病，消费者理论先述，厂商理论与之相似处，尽量都省去。（但不知怎的，这本书连替代弹性这类定义也付之阙如，幸好varian的高级微观是厂商理论打头，至为详备，可以参考）。紧接着赶在均衡理论之前叙述博弈论，作为后面分析的工具之一，然后是局部均衡理论和市场失灵理论。第二册一开始，就进入了全书的高潮阶段：一般均衡，这的确是全书的精华之处，正如〈天龙八部〉第五册开篇的少林寺之会一样，几乎所有重要人物都在此先后登场，故事波澜壮阔，情节诡秘怪谲，在此书一般均衡的阐述中，几乎所有前述重要理论都在此重新出现，各显神通，层层递进，作出一个又一个假设，得出一个又一个结论，让人当叹鬼斧神工，叹为观止。在“均衡与时间”章，动态规划、索洛模型也杀将进来，加入消费者理论、生产者理论、博弈论、不确定性理论之战团，让人惊叹宏观乎？微观乎？当真是汪洋恣肆，横无际涯！紧接高潮之后，作者运用一般均衡理论，对社会福利与社会选择作出了分析。全书在个人需求的分析中开始，在全社会的福利分析中结束。
       金古梁三大侠之理解，多借鉴先贤；微观经济学三本书，我还不曾尽读，即是已读之处，凭在下萤火之资质，又岂能领略其精义之一二？行文至此，皆系读书稍解义趣之时兴起所想，谬误之处在所难免，幸好这仅是学习心得而已，更不求推爱于各位，只求一哂而已。

Credit crisis now hits the well-off
 
 
By Francesco Guerrera and Saskia Scholtes in New York
 
Tuesday, July 29, 2008
 
 
The US financial crisis is spreading from subprime borrowers to wealthier consumers, with evidence mounting that more affluent people are failing to pay their mortgages and credit card balances.
美国金融危机正从刺激抵押贷款的借贷者向富有的消费者蔓延，日益增加的证据显示，更多富人无法支付其贷款和信用卡欠款（差额）。
FT版本翻译：
美国金融危机正从次级抵押贷款的借方，向较富有的客户蔓延。越来越多的证据表明，比较富有的人正无力支付自己的抵押贷款和信用卡余额。

Growing concerns over the financial health of richer borrowers are prompting banks and card issuers to tighten lending practices further in moves that could further dampen consumer confidence and spending.
FT版本翻译：
市场对于较富有借款人财务健康的担忧日益加剧，促使银行和信用卡发行机构采取各种措施收紧贷款，这可能进一步影响消费者信心和支出。

Banks such as JPMorgan Chase and credit card groups such as American Express have clamped down on lending to customers that have traditionally been regarded among the safest and most profitable borrowers.
FT版本翻译：
摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase)等银行和美国运通(American Express)等信用卡集团都收紧了对一些客户的借贷，而他们一向被视为最为安全和有利可图的借方。

“The crisis is just starting to spread beyond the middle class,” said Curtis Arnold, founder of CardRatings.com. “Even folks with good credit-ratings scores are no longer immune from adverse actions from their card issuers.”
FT版本翻译：
CardRatings.com创始人柯蒂斯?阿诺德(Curtis Arnold)表示：“这场危机刚刚开始向中产阶级以外蔓延。即便是那些信用评级得分很高的家伙，也不再能免受其发卡机构不利行动的影响。”

Senior bankers say that after the subprime debacle, the worsening outlook of “prime” portfolios shows the crisis is far from over and could inflict substantial losses on financial institutions.
FT版本翻译：
资深银行家表示，次贷危机爆发以来，“优质”资产的前景不断恶化，表明危机远未结束，有可能使金融机构蒙受巨大损失。

The spreading of the credit crunch to wealthier consumers could hit financial groups, such as JPMorgan and American Express that have so far avoided the worst of the crisis because of their relatively low exposure to subprime customers.
FT版本翻译：
信贷危机向较为富有的客户的蔓延，可能对摩根大通和美国运通等金融机构产生冲击，由于这些机构的次贷客户资产相对较少，迄今为止它们避开了此次危机最糟糕的影响。

Second quarter results from financial companies showed rising losses on mortgages and credit cards issued to prime customers as soaring gas prices, the slowing economy and depressed house values took their toll.
金融公司第二季度的结果显示：由于日益高涨的石油价格、缓慢的经济和下降的房屋价值造成损失，因此，抵押贷款和信用卡方面的损失增加了。
FT版本翻译：
金融公司第二季度业绩显示，由于汽油价格不断飙升、经济日渐放缓及房价下降的影响，面向优质客户的抵押贷款和信用卡业务的亏损不断上升。

Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan's chairman and chief executive, recently told Wall Street analysts that the outlook for prime mortgages was “terrible” and the rate of delinquencies could double or treble from current levels of around 4 per

cent.
FT版本翻译：
摩根大通董事长兼首席执行官杰米·戴蒙(Jamie Dimon)近期向华尔街分析师表示，优质抵押贷款的前景很“糟糕”，逾期欠款率有可能在目前4%的水平上翻一番或两番。

Corporate Finance:

    Payout Policy

Payout policy 本身并没什么有趣的，一般都是和Agency theory, Information asymmetry (Signaling) 或Mispricing 结合在一起才有意思。

Allen, F., and Michaelly, R. 2003. “Payout Policy”. Chapter 7, 337-430, in Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Edited by Constantindes et al, Elsevier North Holland. (这是篇review paper，看了就对这个领域有个大概的印象。)

Fama, E., and French, K. 2001. “Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm Characteristics or Lower Propensity to Pay?”. Journal of Financial Economics 60, 3-43. (Fama又一篇获奖之作，也很是有名。)

Baker, Malcolm., and Wurgler, Jeffrey. 2004. "A Catering Theory of Dividends". Journal of Finance, 1125-1165. (Payout policy 和Behavioral finance结合的代表作。)

Baker, Malcolm., and Wurgler, Jeffrey. 2004. "Appearing and Disappearing of Dividends: The Link to Catering Incentives". Journal of Financial Economics, 271-288. (感觉不如上面那篇JF。搞什么嘛，简直就是overkill.)

Miller, M., and Rock, K. 1985. “Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information”. Journal of Finance, 1031-1051. (翻一下，记住结论即可。)

Benartzi, S., Michaely, R., and Thaler, R. 1997. “Do Changes in Dividends Signal the Future or the Past?”. Journal of Finance, 1007-1033. (关于dividend signaling 的争论就一直没停过, 实在是让人感到有些疲劳。)

Litner, J. 1956. “Distribution of Incomes of Corporations among Dividends, Retained Earnings and Taxes,” American Economic Review, 97-113. （大概是第一个研究这个方面的paper，其model至到今天还在被用。）

Grullon, G., and Michaely, R. 2002. “Dividends, Share Repurchases and the Substitution Hypothesis”. Journal of Finance 62, 1649-1684. (这两人原系师徒。这篇paper写的不是很好，但还算有名。)

Vermaelen, T. 1981. “Common Stock Repurchases and Market Signaling: An Empirical Study”. Journal of Financial Economics, 139-183. (老文了。本来也被引用得不怎么多，但近年来人气很旺，不知何故。读读吧。)

Dann, L. 1981. “Common Stock Repurchases: An Analysis of Returns to Bondholders and Stockholders”. Journal of Financial Economics 9, 113-138. (老Larry也是有些点背，本来这篇paper比上面Vermaelen的那篇要引用的多，但不知何故近来少有人引用。)

Easterbrook, Frank. 1984. “Two Agency-cost Explanations of Dividends”. American Economic Review, 650-659. （该人系lawyer出身，因此很遭某些人排斥。）

Fenn, G., and Liang, N. 2001. “Corporate Payout Policy and Managerial Stock Incentives”. Journal of Financial Economics 60, 45-72.

Bhattacharya, S. 1979. “Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and 'The Bird in the Hand Fallacy'”. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 259-270. (一篇老文，很多人引用。翻翻就可以了。)

Guay, Wayne., and Harford, J. 2000. “The Cash-Flow Permanence and Information Content of Dividend Increases vs. Repurchases”. Journal of Financial Economics 57, 385-415.? (Guay是accounting 里的青年才俊，在Wharton做的不错. 和Harford以前读书时是同学，据说网球打得很好。)

Jagannathan, M., Stephens, C., and Weisbach, M. 2000. “Financial Flexibility and the Choice between Dividends and Stock Repurchases”. Journal of Financial Economics 57, 355-384. (和上面那篇paper讲的是差不多的意思。这篇明显有些赶工的痕迹。大概是为了抢着发表。这两篇最后都在同一本杂志的同一期上发了，要是不抢，让上面那篇先发，这篇就发不了了。)

DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., and Skinner, D. 1996. “Reversal of Fortune, Dividend Signaling and the Disappearance of Sustained Earnings Growth”. Journal of Financial Economics 40, 341-371. (又是一篇signaling 的paper。DeAngelo两人对dividends情有独钟，大部分文章都和dividends 有关。感兴趣的可以去他们网页看看，这里就不多举了。)

Kahle, K. 2002. “When a Buyback isn’t a Buyback: Open-market Repurchases and Employee Options”. Journal of Financial Economics 63, 235-261.

Stephens, C., and Weisbach, M. 1998. “Actual Share Reacquisitions in Open-market Repurchase Programs”. Journal of Finance 55, 313-334.

Ikenburry, D., Lakonishock, J. and Vermaelen, T. 1995. “Market Underreaction to Open Market Stock Repurshases”. Journal of Financial Economics, 405-435.

Healy, P. and Palepu, K. 1988. “Earnings Information Conveyed by Dividend Initiations and Omissions”. Journal of Financial Economics, 149-175.

Michaely, R., Thaler, R., and Womack, K. 1995. “Piece Reactions to Dividend Intention and Omissions: Overreaction or Drift?”.? Journal of Finance, 573-608.

John, K., and Williams, J. 1985. “Dividends, Dilution, and Taxes: a Signaling Equilibrium”. Journal of Finance 40, 1053-1070. (老文，翻一下，记住结论即可。)

Grullon, Gustavo., Michaely, Roni. 2004. “The Information Content of Share Repurchase Programs”. Journal of Finance, 651-680.

Elton, E., and Gruber, M. 1970. “Marginal Stockholders’ Tax Rates and the Clientele Effect”. Review of Economics and Statistics 52, 68-74. (比较早的一篇关于clientele effects和dividends的文章。现在这种文章海量了，感兴趣的自己搜好了。)

International Finance

这个我不太了解，推荐几篇我知道的吧。其实说穿了基本上也就是用international data来验证已有的theory, 不会去做些什么汇率之类啦，跨国银行之类啦，FDI等等。在美国，上面提到的那些东西可都是属于经济系(Economics), 和金融(Finance)不怎么沾边。

Doidge, C. 2004. “US Cross-listing and the Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from Dual Class Firms”. Journal of Financial Economics, 519-554. (Craig 是加拿大帅哥，当年为了女友，毅然选择了去U of Toronto. 他应该是近几年来Ohio State 所毕业的最出色的学生之一。当年他选择这个dissertation topic 是冒了风险的，因为不是所有人对international data都是那么相信的。有句话怎么说的, “Great achievements involve great risk”. )

Doidge, C., Karolyi, C., and Stulz, R. 2004. “Why are Foreign Firms that are Listed in the US Worth More?”. Journal of Financial Economics, 205-238.

La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. 1999. “Corporate Ownership around the World”. Journal of Finance, 471-517.

La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 2000. “Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World”. Journal of Finance, 1-33.

Morck, R., Yeung, B., and Wu, W. 2000. “The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?”. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 58, 215-260.

Mutual Funds

Johnson, Woodrow. 2003. “Predictable Investment Horizons and Wealth Transfers among Mutual Fund Shareholders”. 2004. Journal of Finance, 1979-2012. （Columbia 毕业的，和去Connell的那个中国女孩是同学。人很聪明，很有才华，但对学生很一般般。个人认为此文是econometrics 技巧在finance papers中的最完美应用之一篇经典。）

Chan, Louis K. C., Chen, Hsiu-Lang., and Lakonishok, Josef. 2002. “On Mutual Fund Investment Styles”. Review of Financial Studies, 1407-1437.

Hendricks, D., Patel. J., and Zeckhauser, R. 1993. “Hot Hands in Mutual Funds: Short-run Persistence of Relative Performance, 1974-1988”. Journal of Finance 48, 93-130.

Grinblatt, M., and Titman, T. 1993. “Performance Measurement without Benchmarks: An

Examination of Mutual Fund Returns”. Journal of Business 66, 47-68.

Carhart, Mark. 1997. “On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance”. Journal of Finance 52, 57-82. (Chicago 毕业的，好像是Fama的高足。该文是第一个提出survivorship bias的，非常之经典。)

Del Guercio, D. 1996. "The Distorting Effect of the Prudent-Man Laws on Institutional Equity Investors," Journal of Financial Economics 40, 31-62. (Diane 对学生比较负责，愿意花很多时间指导学生。为人也很smooth，年轻时是美女，穿着也很有品。)

Coval, Joshua D., and Moskowitz, T. 1999. “Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios”. Journal of Finance 54, 2045-2073.

Gompers, Paul., and Metrick, A. 2001. “Institutional Investors and Equity Prices”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 229-259.

Jensen, Michael. 1968. “The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964”.

Journal of Finance, 23, 389-416. (Mutual funds 最早也是最有名的经典之一。Jensen’s Alpha 总该听说过吧？就是源自此处。)

Zheng, Lu. 1999. “Is Money Smart? A Study of Mutual Fund Investors' Fund Selection Ability”. Journal of Finance, 54, 901-933. (中国美女的大作，推一下。她是Yale毕业的，后来去了Michigan. 这篇文章好像得了个奖。)

Edelen, Roger. 1999. “Investor Flows and the Assessed Performance of Open-end Mutual Funds”. Journal of Financial Economics 53, 439-466. (也很经典。好像就是他引起了flow 和 performance之间的热潮。)

Edelen, Roger., and Warner, J. 2001. “Aggregate Price Effects of Institutional Trading: a Study of Mutual Fund Flow and Market Returns”. Journal of Financial Economics, 59, 195-220.

Brown, Keith C., Harlow, W., and Starks, L. 1996. “Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry”. Journal of Finance, 51, 85-110.

Chalmers, John., Roger, Edelen., and Kadlec, G. 2001. “On the Perils of? Financial Intermediaries Setting Security Prices: the Mutual Fund Wild Card Option”. Journal of Finance, 2209-2236. (算是近几年来mutual funds里比较有名的一篇。题目很古怪，其实就是说各个地方trading时间上的差异导致managers有机可乘。

Chevalier, Judith., and Ellison, G. 1999. “A Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 389-432.

Falkenstein, Eric G. 1996. “Preferences for Stock Characteristics as Revealed by Mutual Fund Portfolio Holdings”. Journal of Finance, 111-135.

Warther, Vincent A. 1995. “Aggregate Mutual Fund Flows and Security Returns”. Journal of Financial Economics, 209-235.

Sirri, Erik., and Tufano, P. 1998. “Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows”. Journal of Finance 53, 1589-1622.

Gruber, Martin. 1996. “Another Puzzle: the Growth in Actively Managed Mutual Funds.” Journal of Finance 51, 783-810.

Reuter, J. 2006. “Are IPO Allocations for Sale? Evidence from Mutual Funds”. Journal of Finance, 2289-2324. (Jon毕业于MIT，大概是我见过的人当中最聪明的一个，虽然他现在还不怎么有名。为人超好, 非常非常nice， 也很正直。个人认为Jon是个很值得结交的人。如有机会当他学生，一定要选他当committee member. 好人指数：100/100。)

Market Microstructure

Kyle, Albert S. 1985. “Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading”. Econometrica, 53, 1315-1335.

Glosten, Lawrence., and Milgrom, P. 1985. “Bid, Ask and Transcation Prices in a Dealer Market with Heterogenously Informed Traders”. Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 71-100.

O'Hara, Maureen. 2003. “Presidential Address: Liquidity and Price Discovery”. Journal of Finance, 58, 1335-1354.

Madhavan, A. 2002. “Market Microstructure: A Practitioner's Guide”. Financial Analysts Journal, 58, 28-42.

Harriss, J. H., and Schultz, P. 1998. “The Trading Profits of SOES Bandits”. Journal of Financial Economics, 50, 39-62.

Harris, Lawrence and Hasbrouck, J. 1996. “Market vs. Limit Orders: The Superdot Evidence on Order Submission Strategy”. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31, 213-231.

Jones, Charles M., and Lipson, M. 2001. “Sixteenths: Direct Evidence on Institutional Execution Costs”. Journal of Financial Economics, 59, 253-278.

Schultz, Paul. 2001. “Corporate Bond Trading Costs: a Peek Behind the Curtain”. Journal of Finance, 677-698.

Behavioral Finance

这是finance新兴的一个方向。主要是结合Asset Pricing 和Corporate Finance的理论加进心理学的一些东西进行empirical 方面的研究。其在Asset Pricing 这个方面主要是mispricing 的研究，Corporate Finance这个方面可就多了。这里面的大家当然要属老当益壮的Richard Thaler, 和后起之秀Jeffery Wurgler. 大名鼎鼎的Shleifer也做不少这方面的研究。读了下面的几篇papers你应该能感觉到Behavioral Finance 是做什么的。感兴趣的，自已去他们的website把他们的papers都读一遍吧。

Barberis, Nicholas and Thaler, Richard H. 2003. "A Survey of Behavioral Finance". Handbook of the Economics of Finance.

Baker, Malcolm., Ruback, Richard., and Wurgler, Jeffery. 2004. “Behavioral Corporate Finance: A Survey”. Handbook of Empirical Corporate Finance.

Hirshleifer, D. 2001. “Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing”. Journal of Finance, 1533-1597.

Fama, E. 1998. “Market Efficiency, Long-term Returns, and Behavioral Finance”. Journal of Financial Economics, 283-306. (该文曾获JFE大奖。Fama 是个死忠 “Market is efficient” 的人，应此对他的观点要持一定的怀疑态度。)

Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. 1997. “The Limits of Arbitrage”, Journal of Finance, 52, 35-55.

Malmendier, U., and Tate, G. 2005. “CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment”. Journal of Finance, 2661-2700. (这两个人都挺有个性。Malmendier 是个欧洲女孩，一头金发。听说以前是练体操的，难怪身材特像小女孩。加上说话又快，往前面一站就像个高中生。Tate 是个美国帅哥，Wharton的教授。很儒雅，说话也有板有眼。应该是许多女生的偶像。)

Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 1998. “A Model of Investor Sentiment”. Journal of Financial Economics, 307-343.

Baker, M., and Wurgler, J. 2000. “The Equity Share in New Issues and Aggregate Stock Returns”. Journal of Finance 55, 2219-2257. (Wurgler的处女作，也是这篇文章开始引起人们的注意。)

Heaton, J. 2002. “Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance”. Financial Management, 33-45.

Corporate Finance:

Introduction and Overview of Corporate Finance

Brennan, 1995, “Corporate finance over the past 25 years”, Financial Management 24, Summer, 9-22.

Hart, O., 1989, “An economist’s perspective on the theory of the firm”, Columbia Law Review 89, 1757-1774.

Williamson, O., 1981, “The modern corporation: origins, evolution, attributes”, Journal of Economic Literature 1537-1568.

Graham, J. and Harvey, C. 2000. “The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance: Evidence from the Field”. Journal of Financial Economics 60, 187-244.

Corporate Finance:

    Agency Theory and Ownership

Fama, E., and Jensen, M. 1983. “Agency Problems and Residual Claims”. Journal of Law and Economics, 327-349.

Fama, E., and Jensen, M. 1983. “Separation of Ownership and Control”. Journal of law and economics, 301-325.（美国现代金融Agency Theory 的开山之作。不过这两篇写得不是很好。非要两篇一起看才看得明白。）

Fama, E. 1978. “The Effects of a Firm’s Investment and Financing Decisions on the Welfare of Its Securityholders”. American Economic Review 68, 272-284. (这其实不完全算Agency theory, 但他用很通俗的英语解释了一个有意思的问题。)

Jensen, M., and Meckling, W. 1976. "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," Journal of Financial Economics, 305-360. (这么经典的paper 就不用多介绍了吧。)

Demsetz. 1983. “The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm”. Journal of Law and Economics 26, 375-390. (Demsetz关于ownership的看法别具一格。和上面的Jensen-Meckling对照着读更有体会。)

Jensen, M. 1986. “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers”. American Economic Review, 323-329. (在Corporate Finance领域家喻户晓的paper. 其他Finance的人没读过也基本上听说过。)

Myers, S. 1977. “The Determinants of Corporate Borrowing”. Journal of Financial Economics 5, 146-175. (将agency problem between bondholders and stockholders 与firm’s investment strategy 联系起来的经典文章。)

Parrino, R., and Weisbach, M. 1999. “Measuring Investment Distortions Arising from Stockholder-bondholder Conflict”. Journal of Financial Economics 53, 3-42 (也是获奖之作。方法很新颖，有创意，居然能想出用simulation来做corporate finance。不过，如果不是Weisbach, 估计也不好发。做research 就是这样，名人尝试新东西叫有创意，不出名的人尝试新东西叫冒险。)

Harford, J. 1999. “Corporate Cash Reserves and Acquisitions”. Journal of Finance 54, 1969-1997. (Jarrad 也是少年成名，是Rochester毕业，JFE的嫡系部队。大概是JFE最年轻的Associate Editor. 目前corporate finance领域最出名的年轻俊杰之一。)

Opler, T., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R., and Williamson, R. 1999. “The Determinants and Implications of Corporate Cash Holdings”. Journal of Financial Economics, 52, 3-46.

Lie, E. 2000. “Excess Funds and Agency Problems: An Empirical Study of Incremental Cash Disbursements”. Review of Financial Studies 13, 219-248.

Morck, R., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 1988. “Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis”. Journal of Financial Economics, 293-315.

Corporate Finance:

    Information, Investors and Corporate Policy

这里面有些不属于corporate finance 的范畴。他山之石，可以攻玉，知识面广一些对做research很有好处。不同领域本来就有交叉，想分很清楚也不太容易。

Akerlof, George. 1970. “The market for “lemons”: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 89, 488-500. (要是让我列个My favorite Top 10 papers, 这篇文章绝对在其中。Akerlof 居然用最最简单的model, 来把一个最最复杂的理论解释得清清楚楚，难怪能得诺贝尔奖。现在有些人正好相反，用最最复杂的model, 把一个最最简单的理论解释得晕头转向。这些人其实不应该做finance, 应该去搞数学或物理。)

Ross, S. 1977. “The Determinants of Capital Structure: The Incentive-signaling Approach”. Bell Journal of Economics 8, 23-40. (Ross的这篇也很经典。提起他大多数人会想起APT, 其实他对corporate finance 贡献也很大。这篇很有上面提到的Akerlof的风格，都是用很简单的model阐述一个深奥的理论。Ross这个人也很不错，平易近人，很幽默，健谈，没有一点架子，和谁都能见面熟。人格魅力指数：100/100。)

Myers, S.C., and Majluf, N.? 1984. “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have”. Journal of Financial Economics, 187-221. (影响很大的一篇文章。后来的IPO underpricing 和 Pecking order theory 等等许多都基于此。可以说对corporate finance 各个领域都有影响。）

Hart, O. 2001. “Financial Contracting”. Journal of Economic Literature 39, 1079-1100.

Thakor. 1989. “Strategic Issues in Financial Contracting: An Overview”. Financial Management, 39-58.

Spence, Michael. 1973. “Job market signaling”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 355-74.

Rothschild, Michael., and Stiglitz, Joseph. 1976. “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: an Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90, 629-649.

Grossman, Sanford., and Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1980. “On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets”. American Economic Review, 70, 393-408.

Merton, Robert C. 1987. “A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information”. Journal of Finance, 483-510.

Corporate Finance:

Capital Structure, Financing Decisions, Investment and Taxes

Miller, M., and Modigliani, F. 1958.“The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment”. American Economic Review, 261-297. (什么，没读过？你洗洗睡吧。少数几篇做Finance而获诺贝尔经济学奖的大作，不读不行。)

Miller, M., and Modigliani, F. 1963. “Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction”. American Economic Review, 433-443. (这是他们AER1958大作的续篇。那篇大作中有一处错误，但当时没有什么人能看得懂这篇划时代的巨作，就像爱因斯坦当年发表相对论一样。直到5年后被他们自己发现，才有了这篇文章。不过，原文的结论不受影响，所以他们才在30几年后得了诺贝尔奖。)

Harris, M. and A. Raviv. 1991. “The Theory of Capital Structure”. Journal of Finance, 297-368. (MM之后capital structure基本上被做烂了，文章数量只能用汗牛充栋来形容。看这篇review paper 能让你少看不少papers.)

Baker, M., and Wurgler, J. 2002. “Market Timing and Capital Structure”, Journal of Finance, 1-32. (一篇很有创意的文章，算是behavioral corporate finance 最有代表性的佳作。该文引起很大争议，到今天批它的文章恐怕只有用过江之鲫来形容。到不是这俩人对头多，只是这篇文章影响太大，批它比批一篇不出名的文章更容易引起人们的兴趣，和方舟子打假有点相似。)

Frank, M., and Goyal, V. 2003. “Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics 67, 217-248. (很有名的一篇paper, 虽然我不太喜欢。该文曾获JFE的奖，是近年来在capital structure这个领域有影响的文章。)

Mehrotra, V., Mikkelson, M., and Partch, M. 2003. “The Design of Financial Policies in Corporate Spin-offs”. Review of Financial Studies 16, 1359-1388. (Idea有新意。Mikkelson 曾报怨这篇paper被under appreciated。)

Berger, P., Ofek, E., and Yermack, D. 1997. “Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions”. Journal of Finance, 1411-1437.

Masulis, R., 1980. “The Effects of Capital Structure Change on Security Prices: A Study of Exchange Offers”. 1980. Journal of Financial Economics, 139-178.

Chemmanur, T., and Paolo, F. 1999. “A Theory of the Going-Public Decision”. Review of Financial Studies 12, 249-279.

Dunbar, C. 1995. “The Use of Warrants as Underwriter Compensation in Initial Public Offerings”. Journal of Financial Economics 38, 59-78.

DeAngelo, H., and Masulis, R. 1980. “Optimal Capital Structure under Corporate and Personal Taxation”. Journal of Financial Economics 8, 3-29.

Miller, M. 1977. “Debt and Taxes”. Journal of Finance 32, 261-275.

Graham, J. 2000. “How Big are the Tax Benefits of Debt?”. Journal of Finance 55, 1901-1941. (Graham 是个很能想很有创意的人。本来这个topic都被做烂了，但他能想出一些个很新奇很有创造性的方法去做。佩服ing. )

Graham, J. 2003. “Taxes and Corporate Finance: A Review”. Review of Financial Studies 16, 1075-1129.

Kaplan, S., and Stromberg, P. 2003. “Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts”. Review of Economic Studies, 285-315.

Andrade, G., and Kaplan, G. 1998. “How Costly is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed”. Journal of Finance 53, 1443-1493. (题目是不是不好懂？Kaplan的一贯风格是用data来轰炸你，弄得你晕头转向。看过这篇就有体会了。)

Kaplan, S., and Zingales, L. 1997. “Do Financing Constraints Explain Why Investment Is Correlated With Cash Flow?”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 169-215. (Cash flow sensitivity 的争论就是他们搞起来的。)

Gertner, R., and Scharfstein, D. 1991. “A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law”. Journal of Finance 46, 1189-1222.

Froot, K., Scharfstein, D., and Stein, J. 1993. “Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies”. Journal of Finance 48, 1629-1658.

Fama, E., and French, K. 2005. “Financing Decisions: Who Issues Stock”. Journal of Financial Economics, 549-582.

Fama, E., and French, K. 2002. "Testing Tradeoff and Pecking Order Predictions about Dividends and Debt". Review of Financial Studies, 1-37. (读Fama-French的文章有时候并不一定因为是篇好文，只是因为别人都读。)

Corporate Finance:

    Corporate Governance

Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 1997. “A Survey of Corporate Governance”. Journal of Finance, 737- 783. (做corporate governance 的如何能够不读这篇paper. Corporate governance 这个词就是他们定义出来的。)

La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. 2000. “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance”. Journal of Financial Economics, 3-27.

Brickley, J., Coles, J., and Terry,R. 1994. “Outside Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills”. Journal of Financial Economics 35, 371-390.

Byrd, J., and Hickman, K. 1992. “Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence from Tender Offer Bids”. Journal of Financial Economics 32, 195-222.

Core, J., Holthausen, R., and Larcker, D. 1999. “Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance”. Journal of Financial Economics 51, 371-406.

Cotter, J., Shivdasani, A., and Zenner, M. 1997. “Do Independent Directors Enhance Target Shareholders Wealth During Tender Offers?”. Journal of Financial Economics 43, 195-218.

Harford, J. 2003. “Takeover Bids and Target Directors’ Incentives: The Impact of a Bid on Directors’ Wealth and Board Seats”. Journal of Financial Economics, 51-83.

Denis, D., and Sarin, A. 1999. “Ownership and Board Structures in Publicly Traded Corporations”. Journal of Financial Economics 52, 187-224.

Del Guercio, D., Dann, L., and Partch, Megan. 2003. “Governance and Boards of Directors in Close-end Investment Companies”. Journal of Financial Economics 69, 111-152.

Gompers, P., Ishii, J., and Metrick, A. 2003. “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 107-155. (这篇文章也有些争议，不过现在是被引用得越来越多了。)

Hermalin, B., and Weisbach, M. 1988. “The Determinants of Board Composition”. RAND Journal of Economics 19, 589-606.

Hermalin, B., and Weisbach, M. 2003. “Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: a Survey of the Economic Literature”. Federal Reserve Bank at New York, Economic policy review, April 2003. (一篇survey paper，虽然不是发表在学术期刊上，但值得一读。)

Jensen, M. 1993. “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems”. Journal of Finance, 831-880. (记得是Jensen在某一年的讲话，读一下吧。)

Mikkelson, W., and Partch, M. 1997. “The Decline of Takeovers and Disciplinary Managerial Turnover”. Journal of Financial Economics 44, 205-228. (1997年获JFE大奖的文章。觉得还是挺有创意的。)

Weisbach, M. 1988. “Outside Directors and CEO Turnover”. Journal of Financial Economics 20, 431-460. (最早的一篇研究board composition 对corporate policy影响。)